After five months of investigation , somebody - searching and naval - gazing , BP ’s released its report today summarizing precisely how a catastrophe such as theirGulf of Mexicooil spilldisaster could have occur . And it ’s a doozy .
Amazingly , BP is n’t shoulder the incrimination themselves . Oh no . alternatively , they ’ve generously diffuse it amongst the “ multiple company and work teams ” who were involved ( listing BP , Halliburton and Transocean as just several of the “ parties ” ) , with the soon - to - be - former CEO of BP , Tony Hayward , explained that “ there was a bad cement problem and a loser of the shoe track barrier at the bottom of the well , which let hydrocarbons from the man-made lake into the output casing . The negative pressure test was accepted when it should not have been , there were failures in well control procedures and in the drift - out preventer ; and the rig ’s fire and accelerator pedal arrangement did not prevent lighting . ”
The following reasons also impart to the spill :
The cement and shoe track barriers – and in peculiar the cement slurry that was used – at the bottom of the Macondo well failed to contain hydrocarbon within the reservoir , as they were designed to do , and allowed gas and liquids to menstruate up the production casing ;
The results of the disconfirming press test were wrongly take on by BP and Transocean , although well wholeness had not been established ;
Over a 40 - second period , the Transocean trailer truck crew fail to recognise and act on the inflow of hydrocarbons into the well until the hydrocarbon were in the riser and rapidly flowing to the surface ;
After the well - flow get to the rig it was routed to a clay - gasolene separator , causing gas to be give vent directly on to the rig rather than being diverted overboard ;
The flow of gas into the railway locomotive rooms through the ventilation system created a voltage for ignition which the tractor trailer ’s fervidness and gas scheme did not forestall ;
Even after explosion and attack had disabled its work party - run controls , the rig ’s blow - out preventer on the sea - bed should have activate automatically to seal the well . But it failed to operate , probably because critical portion were not exercise .
With 11 deadened and thou of lives impact — employees , fisherman , conservation workers , portion - holders , not to cite the living of the land and ocean creatures either drop off or damaged by the spillage , it ’s exasperate to see that BP can be so quick to point blame at other companies and people . Perhaps they ’re equally to pick , yes , but when BP knew of the close at hand peril almost a twelvemonth ago and did n’t do anything about it ( indeed , they actually turned off the rig ’s critical alert organization ) , I find the paper is a difficult birth control pill to bury .
If you ’ve get the stomach for it , a half - minute video explaining the investigationcan be viewed here . [ BPviaBBC ]
deepwater horizonGulf of Mexico
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